Thursday, September 17, 2009

This is not a work of art - on Benjamin's "The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction"

Ceci n'est pas une œuvre d'art

(This is not a work of art)


“In principal a work of art has always been reproducible…Mechanical reproduction of a work of art, however, represents something new.” (p. 35)

Benjamin’s seminal work, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ examines “Art” as it finds itself in an age of mechanical reproduction. An obvious and tautological point, but a point into this difficult text nevertheless. By stating this tautology we may separate works of art in their respective ages of reproducibility, that is, works may be spoken of reproductively in an age of Manual reproduction and Mechanical reproduction. This interpretative entryway also makes it drastically clear that Benjamin regards some works of human effort as ‘artistic’ and indeed that art did not, nor has not, vanished in the age of mechanical reproduction.

Benjamin begins by briefly outlining the historical modes of reproducing a work of art, which he acknowledges, at the offset, has always been possible and been done. The crucial difference in the age of mechanical reproduction lies not in that a work was reproduced, but in how that work might have been, or was, reproduced. When pupils sought to imitate their master, or the master sought to become better known, and both sought to sustain themselves through monetary gain, works of art were reproduced, but however close the replica, the imitation was, it still was on the order of a lack. As Benjamin says, “Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking on one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be. This unique existence of the work of art determined the history to which it was subject throughout the time of its existence.” (p. 36) Indeed looking to the historical sense of the word ‘replica’ which Benjamin uses to describe reproduced works of art in the manual age shows the force of Benjamin’s argument. ‘Replica’ coming from the latin replicare, meaning ‘to reply, to repeat’ indicates an original to which a “reply” might be offered or given in the first place. One must have something or someone in view in order to copy, to imitate, to replicate. This is why Benjamin writes that, “The presence of the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity…The whole sphere of authenticity is outside technical – and, of course, not only technical – reproducibility.” The original artwork is singular. From its unique presence authenticity is established. Authenticity allows for claims of authority to be made. And from authority an artwork has its ‘aura’. Authority is not simply the artwork’s power to influence, to affect those who behold it (although this is incredibly important), but is also the artwork’s historical testimony. Thus the aura of the artwork lies in a presence that is yet distant – a 3,000 year old Greek statue or a 50 million year old mountain is distant in time, yet may be brought so near that in certain moments you feel as if its’ shadow encroaches upon you, just as if a friend (or enemy) approaches who is close in time to you. To Benjamin, this is not possible in a mechanically reproduced work of art. A copy can never be wholly present to itself, and thus never authentic and never authoritative in these ways. As he says, “aura is tied to presence, there can be no replica of it.” (p. 42)

Yet in Benjamin there appears to be not only two planes to an artwork (cult and exhibition value, p. 39) but two dimensions to a work of art as well. If the ‘cult value’ of art is on its way out according to Benjamin (p. 40), and instead ‘exhibition value’ ever-increases, the focus of the artwork shifts in presence, authenticity, and authority. The artworks ability to affect (in a certain way), to bare-with and transcend time by being permanent and unique (built on ritualized presence) may be on its way out, but as he says, “With Atget, photographs become standard evidence for historical occurrences, and acquire a hidden political significance. They demand a specific kind of approach; free floating contemplation is not appropriate to them.” (p. 40) Thus photos begin to re-speak of authority in works of representation; they move towards a historical ‘truth of fact’, without reference to a kind of authenticity built on a kind of presence that finds itself based on as Benjamin states, “a parasitical dependence on ritual.” (p. 39) In other words, in a courtroom it is crucial to establish that events occurred as the photos show.

It is important to point out that Benjamin states that, “that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art. This is a symptomatic process whose significance points beyond the realm of art.” In permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in their own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced. These two processes lead to a tremendous shattering of tradition, which is the obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of humankind.” (p. 37) With regard to the/(or) an apocalypse, Benjamin’s “The Work of Art” calls us to ask ourselves several questions. As he notes, this symptomatic process pertains to more than just art. When he speaks of statistics (p. 38), or how asking for the ‘authentic’ print makes no sense (p. 39), may we speak of asking for the ‘authentic’ person in an age of mechanically reproduced styles of life? What of the unique human in the era of the stat? Are there singular encounters left to have? Does not the “de-aura-ing” of the world constitute an apocalypse? If we strive to make works of art out of our very lives, what happens when they can be not only imitated, attempted to be replicated, but indeed copied without any distinctions ad infinitum?

6 comments:

  1. The aura is a "unique phenomenon of a distance" (p. 38). It is not the actuality of the distance, but the experience that transpires because of the distance between the object and the “audience.” The aura exists as the relationship between the eye of perception of the “audience” and the object that is seen and perceived. In this relationship there is a desire of the viewer, or audience, to minimize this distance. The "audience" is connecting to the object and for a moment the distance dissipates. The desire to be closer to the object is what gives the object value.
    The “contemporary decay of the aura” (p. 38) is due to the lack of distance. In film particularly, because of the lack of distance, the relationship is not enticed by the viewer; there is no desire to make the distance shrink because “the film” is readily available to the “audience.” The uniqueness of the experience of the aura as a viewer connects to the object is not present in “the film” because as “the film” is reproduced excessively, the experience of the film is easily repeatable. Experiencing a film is not an active reciprocal relationship, but instead is a passive distraction. The value of an object that exists due to the significance of the aura cannot exist in “the film” with the same intensity.
    The moment of the aura is apocalyptic because as the viewer connects with the object, there is an intense emotional outcome. The value of art is due to this apocalyptic moment when one can be changed, transformed, moved by this experience.

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  2. For Benjamin these questions seems to hinge on a paradox: "The destructiveness of war furnishes proof that society has not been mature enough to incorporate technology as its organ, that technology has not been sufficiently developed to cope with the elemental forces of society" (50).

    So, war proves that humans are not mature enough for their own technologies, *but also* that humans have not developed the right kind of technologies that can actually "cope with the elemental forces of society." This is subtle and vexing: we must bracket and critique the technologies already out there because we are not mature enough for them (we kill each other and maintain unfair property relations with them), and yet we also have to work to develop technologies in new ways, technologies that will be better suited to flex with (rather than simply reinforce from the outside, as it were) actual societal "forces." Technology has the potential to become an "organ" of humanity, in (I think) a positive sense—but we haven't managed it yet.

    How can we accept this double imperative? And what does 'art' have to do with it? Benjamin seems to suggest that whenever we see art in an age of mechanical reproducibility, we should politicize it, to take account of what relations are being maintained or enforced in its (re)production and dissemination. In other words, art becomes *the* way to see the actual political foundation of a society—and perhaps to change it.

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  3. I agree Dr. Schaberg that, "Benjamin seems to suggest that whenever we see art in an age of mechanical reproducibility, we should politicize it", but what may be said of his claim against "aestheticizing politics": "All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: War. War and only war can set a goal for mass movements on the largest scale while respecting the traditional property system. (p. 49)

    On the one hand it seems easy enough to understand how by making the Führer an object of desire (affection, love etc.) there is a distraction from the issues of class, indeed of politics because the Leader would be beyond critique. In this sense, one should be wary of aestheticizing 'the political'. But this seems to be too reminiscent of a French Absolutism (Louis XIV and Versailles redirecting the aristocracy) to really register the hereto unknown aspect of Hitler's personality and power (even though Benjamin does speak of a 'Führer cult').

    On the other how can the human not deem its political projects as 'beautiful'? Marxist art has consistently rejected ''l'art pour l'art", as if art can ever be in-itself/of-itself detached from its basic economic modes of production and human relations which makes it what it was/is in the first place. And this would be in line with 'politicizing art' but would not there be a reflexivity to this, such that the reality of those conditions are first seen as beautiful, as worthy of being-art; at which point art reflects the Real of economic conditions and inspires (lit. breaths-life into) the proletariat?

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  4. S. Ritter I think you're right when you write, "The aura is a "unique phenomenon of a distance" (p. 38). It is not the actuality of the distance, but the experience that transpires because of the distance between the object and the “audience.” But I hesitate to concur with you on reading "distance" as a purely (or primarily even) spatial and/or economic relation between the work of art and the "I/eye of perception".

    As Benjamin says, "Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking on one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be. This unique existence of the work of art determined the history to which it was subject throughout the time of its existence." (p. 36) Thus when you notice correctly that, "The 'contemporary decay of the aura' (p. 38) is due to the lack of distance", I don't think it follows that this is, "because 'the film' is readily available to the 'audience'". This economic availability of the product is certainly noteworthy, and indeed it is this availability (or ability to reproduce the artwork exactly) that leads to the destruction of the Singularity of the artwork, which is the Aura of the art-Thing. That is why for example Benjamin can speak of mountains and tree branches as having an aura, not because of their cultural re-presentation (e.g. a painting of the mountain), they are natural, but rather because of their singularity, which establishes an authenticity, which in some way affects the beholder.

    So when you write, "the uniqueness of the experience of the aura as a viewer connects to the object is not present in “the film” because as “the film” is reproduced excessively, the experience of the film is easily repeatable. Experiencing a film is not an active reciprocal relationship, but instead is a passive distraction", I think it is more the case that the film loses any aura in the reproducibility of its Form (which use to be singular but now is a perfect copy, a perfected imitation) rather than of itself per se. After all, how many humans throughout history have experienced what Benjamin writes of when seeing mountains and branches and 'feeling' their presence? Indeed, how many times in one's life can one have a Similar experience? Presumably many times, but each time is unique. It cannot be exactly the same (if the experience is to be filled with aura). The cultural artwork, which use to be singular like the mountain, however is now throughly reproducible in exactable terms, which is where economics and cheap reproduction comes in.

    Consequently, when Benjamin writes directly of "following with your eyes" the horizon, which may be seen as an active component necessary for art and aura, it cannot be forgotten that he also writes of the mountain range, "casting its' shadow". Certainly Benjamin is the passive one in that relation, and it doesn't follow that going and looking at mountains as a way to distract oneself from pressing concerns, or just idle moments of self, in any substantial way invalidate the experiencing of aura; because the experience lies not the moment of viewing the rare, the different, but rather, in viewing the singular.

    When you write of "the moment of the aura [as being] apocalyptic because as the viewer connects with the object" do you not think that it is precisely this 'moment' which is on its way out (of history), and that this extermination is apocalyptic? Does one always connect with the artwork in a moment of apocalyptic aura (which use to be singular, authentic, authoritative and now is an object copied, "fake", and relative) or can persons be artworks (not objects), and if aura is in a state of decay, then what of persons, and their possible aura?

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  5. Dr. Schaberg as a side note: what do you make of Benjamin's use of Marinetti's "War is beautiful" manifesto? Benjamin seems to be the anti-aesthetical individual that Marinetti targets...that is, war is beautiful precisely because of, not in spite of, its' ghastliness (and this seems to be where Benjamin critiques fascist ideology).

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  6. This is a great discussion. Samantha, when you say "The moment of the aura is apocalyptic because as the viewer connects with the object, there is an intense emotional outcome."—I wonder, along with Bryan, if this 'apocalyptic' outcome is the product of a 'connection' ("the viewer connects...") or if it is in fact a *disconnect*—if the aura, in other words, is crucial because it maintains an important (or distinct, at least for Benjamin) *distance* between subject/object (as singularities). Mechanical reproducibility rather upsets the disconnect, or disguises things in terms of seemingly 'immediate' (which are really heavily mediated) 'connections'.

    Bryan, I've always struggled with that last section of the essay, wherein it seems to me that Benjamin presents Marinetti's "War is beautiful" manifesto as a model of "clarity" while also critiquing it (as you say) as a clearly horrifying example of the aestheticization of politics that is fascist ideology.

    Especially provocative to me is Benjamin's suggestion that for the dialecticians, "Imperialistic war is a rebellion of technology which collects, in the form of 'human material', the claims to which society has denied its natural material" (50). Dialectically speaking, could this (also) mean that if humans were to recover technology as a 'natural organ'—would this, in fact, reintroduce the idea of aura into technology, from proximity and connectedness rather than as a phenomenon of distance?—imperialistic war would cease to be possible, because the technologies of war could not be bracketed (aesthetically) from the humans who make/control (or lose control of) them? This is really speculative, and I'm not quite sure how this would play out...which is all to say that I find the epilogue of Benjamin's essay challenging and enigmatic, to say the least.

    I wonder, by the way, if White's "Burden of History" could help us think through this. In fact, would Benjamin's essay count (for White) as a perhaps different way thinking 'historically'? I think it might.

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